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Abstract 
This paper aims at establishing a relationship between disparity of information and the probability of speculative attack 
in explaining the Asian crisis. We apply the general framework of Markov-Switching models to the differential of 
interest rates (DIR), subsequently in Indonesia and Malaysia. We allow dependency of the transition probabilities over 
the asymmetric information indicators. The Maximum Likelihood estimators results (MLE) are twofold: (1) an 
increase of information dispersion among speculators leads to a higher probability of a currency crisis (2) there is a 
significant asymmetric impact of information disparity as measured by the difference between fund price and Net 
Asset Value (NAV) on the transition probability in the case of Indonesia, while the hypothesis is rejected for 
Malaysia's case. 
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1  Introduction 
Whether asymmetric information plays a role in currency crisis is an issue that has important 
implications  for  both  the  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  in  international  finance.  The 
matter  is  critical.  If  for  example,  asymmetric  information  increases  the  probability  of  a 
speculative attack, the exchange rate regimes will be more vulnerable in periods of higher 
disparity  of  information  and  policymakers  should  adjust  their  policies  accordingly,  as 
underlined by Prati and Sbracia (2002, p.1)  
The Asian crisis has caused severe economic turbulence in the economies of South East 
Asia since July 1997,  and has spread beyond the region to reach Russia and Brazil. The 
explanation of the Asian crisis has been the subject of much argument. There is no easy 
consensus  to  be  reached  on  what  lay  behind  it.  According  to  first  generation  models 
(Krugman  (1979),  Flood  and  Garber  (1984)),  currency  crises  are  caused  by  insufficient 
foreign  exchange  reserves  due  to  a  persistent  deficit  in  balance  of  payment  and  bad 
fundamentals. However, the second generation characterizes currency crises as self-fulfilling 
speculative attacks which result in multiple equilibria. Ratti and Seo (2003) provide some 
evidence  of  Korea  being  in  the  zone  of  multiple  equilibria  and  having  self-fulfilling 
speculation at times during 1997 and 1999 using a non linear model. A new generation of 
currency crisis emphasizes financial sector weakness and investor behaviour. These models 
are  called  inter-generation  models  because  they  combine  sequences  of  first  and  second 
generations. Krugman (1998) and Corsetti et al. (1998) explain the Asian crisis using a moral 
hazard model. As a response to the Asian crisis, international policy  makers suggest that 
increased transparency could help to avoid speculative crashes. To date, there has been little 
empirical work on the role of asymmetric information in explaining currency crises, with the 
notable exception of three papers, namely Prati and Sbracia (2002), Metz (2003) and Tillmann 
(2004). While the two first papers study the impact of uncertainty about fundamentals on 
currency crises, the third one uses a different approach. It analyses the impact of uncertainty 
that originates from private information among foreign exchange investors. Tillmann (2004) 
finds that information disparity raised the probability of speculative attack for the French 
Franc and Italian Lira in the European Monetary System (EMS) crisis of 1992.  
We focus particularly on the cases of Indonesia and Malaysia, and try to separate the 
contributions  of  economic  fundamentals  from  asymmetric  information  in  explaining  the 
speculative  events.  Such  contribution  builds  on  the  pioneering  work  of  Morris  and  Shin 
(1998) and Heinemann and Illing (2002). These latter developed a reduced game to model 
currency  attack  under  noisy  private  information.  They  report  that  changes  in  information 
structure of speculators can explain the sudden movements in the probability of devaluation. 
However, linking global games framework to empirical finance seems not to be an easy task. 
That’s why adopting a methodology analogous to that of Tillmann, appears to be the most 
suitable approach for our purpose. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows; section 2 motivates the use of 
country fund premia as an indicator of asymmetric information. Section 3 derives the testable 
implications of the latter inspired from Tillmann’s technical methodology and discusses the 
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2  Country fund premia and asymmetric information 
Frankel and Schmukler (1996, 2000) were the first to introduce asymmetric information into 
the  discussion  about  country  fund  premia/discounts.  Country  funds  premia  describe  the 
reaction of international investors versus local investors. Lack of perfect arbitrage
1 enables us 
to compare the reaction of prices and NAV during the time of crises.  
The  basic  argument  is  that  differing  investors  sentiments  and/or  the  existence  of 
asymmetric market information induces divergent expectations across local and US investors 
during periods of market turbulence. This divergence might be illustrated as follows; “local 
holders  of  underlying  assets  are  assumed  to  have  relatively  superior  access  to  their  own 
markets and economies, and are better in evaluating variations of fund NAVs. However, since 
the  funds  are  traded  on  US  stock  exchange,  US  investors  have  better  information  for 
identifying factors that influence the  fund price movements. This asymmetric information 
generates different expectations, which, in turn, lead to different speeds of processing market 
information and reacting to unexpected news or events.” (Tsai (2010, p2)) 
3  Econometric modelling 
Market participants’ strategic behaviour has the potential to fuel and magnify market turmoil 
and even to trigger financial crises. To capture and understand such pathologies, we propose 
an empirical framework in the spirit of Tillmann (2004), applied to the Asian crisis context. 
Our specific empirical focus is on Indonesia and Malaysia. 
3.1 Data, model description and preliminary analysis 
In models of regime change, the regression parameters depend on an unobservable discrete 
variable whose realization is a Markov chain of first order.  Iterative algorithms based on 
Bayesian procedures  are used to estimate the model’s parameters. The  Markov-Switching 
models are very useful for modelling changes in the economic linkages and their interaction 
with economic fundamentals. They are particularly useful for identifying episodes of crisis 
and non crisis. Jeanne (1996, 2000) demonstrated through this class of models that the French 
Franc  crisis  of  1992-93  had  strong  self  fulfilling  characteristics  and  was  caused  by  a 
phenomenon of “sunspots”. 
The DIR of a country displays different behaviour during periods of “pressure” and 
“stable” periods. In order to capture such asymmetry, we apply a two-state Markov-Switching 
model with time varying transition probabilities. Hamilton (1989, 1990) considered a simple 
version of Markov-Switching with transition probabilities that are fixed (PTF). Later, Diebold 
et al. (1994) developed a Markov-Switching with time-varying transition probabilities (PTV) 
in order to capture the systematic changes in the transition probabilities. Apart from yielding 
more  accurate  estimates  of  the  process,  the  main  advantage  of  Markov-Switching  model, 
often  advocated  in  the  literature,  is  its  ability  to  take  into  account  features  such  as  non 
linearity and the persistence of extreme observations. The regime switching model combines 
two or more sets of model parameters into one system. According to Moore and Wang (2009, 
p. 3), “it is argued that a discrete measure of crisis in probit models, which are frequently 
employed for the analysis of currency crises, leads to a loss of information on the scale of 
speculative pressure.” So, we don’t refer to those models in explaining the role of asymmetric 
                                                 
1 The efficient market hypothesis states that the price of closed-end funds should converge to the NAV. The 
scope for arbitrage is limited due to capital account restrictions and transaction costs. This reflects the fact that 
investors in the local (NAV) and foreign markets (fund prices) differ.   3 
information.  In  our  case,  there  are  two  possible  states  of  nature:  “tranquil”  (st=0)  versus 
“crisis” (st=1) regime. The density function of the DIRt, depending on st, is given by: 
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Where  it F is the fundamental i at time t, i=1, 2, 3. 
In  equation  (2),  the  interest  rate  differential  between  Indonesia  or  Malaysia, 
respectively,  and  United  States  is  regressed  on  three  macroeconomic  fundamentals  (see 
Table1 for details) whose effects are represented by the coefficients 1 q ,  2 q  , and 3 q :  
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Where 
t s m is a regime-specific intercept. Conceptually, the switching parameters need 
not to be restricted to the intercept of the model. We pursue this parsimonious model because 
of the  relatively small size of the sample. The  discrete variable st can  shift between two 
realizations: 
                                                                 1 , 0 , = = j j st                                                              (3) 
                                                         ij t t p i s j s prob = = = - ) / ( 1                                                (4) 
All the transition variables are collected in the (2x2) transition matrix: 
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The transition probabilities are assumed to be time-varying by considering a logistical 
function: 











































                                                 (6) 
Where ii p  : is the probability of remaining in regime i at time t,  ij p  is the probability of 
switching from regime i to j. The coefficient q1 (p1) represents the impact of the proxy on the 
probability of jumping from regime 0 (1) to regime 1 (0). We expect q1 to be negative, which 
means that a speculative attack is more likely if the information is more disparate. Finally, ,
i w  
is  a  proxy  of  information  disparity  among  the  investors.  Following  Tillmann  (2004),  we   4 
consider  the  same  three  measures  of  asymmetric  information,  based  on  the  definition  of 
country fund premia: 
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Where
1 w  measures the difference (in US dollars) between the fund prices and their 
underlying net asset values. This indicator reflects the informational advantage of foreign 
investors  over  local  investors.
2 w and
3 w are  two  measures  of  information  disparity, 
irrespective to which party is better informed than the other. When the fund price exceeds the 
NAV, this difference is called premium, and discount in the opposite case. Table 2 presents 
the statistics for both Southeast Asian countries. Both countries have sold at average premium 
of 2.88% in Indonesia and 4.49% in Malaysia. In general, the window corresponding to the 
currency crisis is not well defined. In order to have a uniform basis for comparison across the 
two funds, we use 117
2-month window starting from mid-July. The non-event window used 
for comparison is the 117-day period preceding the Asian crisis. Statistical significance of 
changes in premia is evaluated using t-statistics from regressions of the premia on a constant 
and  a  dummy  variable  equals  to  one  during  the  117-day  crisis  and  0,  otherwise.  A 
significantly positive coefficient on the dummy variable implies that the premia during the 
crisis are significantly higher than premia before the crisis.  A visual inspection of figures 1 
and 2 shows that premia rose for both funds starting in mid-1997. The jump in premia in the 
case of Indonesia was quite sudden, while the Malaysia’s premia increased slightly, despite 
the country’s economic recovery. In fact, we see discounts shrinking before the free floating 
and turning into premia afterwards. These observations generally coincide with Frankel and 
Schmukler’s findings, namely that foreign investors tend to be more optimistic than local 
investors during the  crisis period. This preliminary analysis urges us to use country fund 
premia as an indicator of information disparity and investigate its impact on the probability of 
speculative attack in a Markov-Switching framework. 
 
Finally, the estimator of maximum likelihood is given by the expression: 
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3.2 Estimation results and discussion 
This study uses monthly
3 data for Indonesia and Malaysia over the period 1990: 3 through 
2001: 3 and 1987: 5 through 2001: 6, respectively. The choice of the period is restricted by 
                                                 
2 Data range from 14/7/1997 to 31/12/1997. We chose to work with a daily basis in order to have a large dataset. 
3 We used monthly data because the Asian fundamentals provided are available on a monthly basis.    5 
the Dataset on fundamentals provided and the availability of fund price and the NAV data. 
These latter were gathered from http://www.etfconnect.com/
4 web site. 
The EM-algorithm was performed using R2.6.0 software
5. In this subsection, we discuss the 
estimation results of the Markov-Switching model with both fixed and time varying transition 
probabilities.   
 
Markov-Switching with fixed transition probabilities 
 
From these results, we can draw the following observations: 
First, in order to identify which regime is more persistent, we need to interpret the probability 
estimates. The estimates of transition probabilities  oo p and  11 p are both highly significant in 
the two South East Asian countries. The probabilities of staying in regime 0 (the values are 
about 0.98) are bigger than the probabilities of staying in regime 1 (the values are about 0.94 
and 0.97, respectively).    
 
Markov-Switching with time varying transition probabilities 
 
Results from estimating the non-linear maximum likelihood model are given in Tables 3.1 
and  4.1.  We  can  see  that  the  coefficients  of  the  three  macroeconomic  fundamentals  are 
statistically significant for the case of Indonesia, and a little bit for Malaysia. They have also 
the expected signs. The regime-switching intercepts are highly significant. It is clear that the 
linear approach is strongly rejected in both cases against the Markov-Switching model as 
shown in table 3.2 and table 4.2 which report the results of Wald specifications tests for 
equality for the regime dependent coefficients. The null hypothesis of equal intercept terms 
across regimes is rejected at high levels of significance for both countries, mirrored by the 
value of likelihood ratio (LR
6). In most cases, the impact of 
i w is negative as measured by the 
coefficient q1 which means that disparate information raises the probability of a currency 
crisis
7. However, only the first disparity of information measure seems to have a significant 
asymmetric impact on the transition probability (Indonesia). The same test fails to detect any 
significant asymmetric impact for the other measures. In the same vein, the results from Table 
4.2 suggest that the expectations of local and foreign investors were not sufficiently divergent 
in Malaysia although there is a statistical significant impact of the measure
2 w .   
Other empirical works that studied PTV models using the exchange market pressure, 
include Cerra and Saxena (2002) who tried to test the contagion effect on the Indonesia’s 
currency crisis from the neighbouring countries (Thailand, Korea). Similarly, Abiad (2003) 
used PTV models to study the Asian crisis, but he hardly found any significant impact of 
fundamentals  on  the  exchange  market  pressure.  All  these  papers  analysed  the  impact  of 
fundamentals/contagion on the exchange market pressure. In our knowledge, this paper is the 
first  to  study  the  combined  effect  of  fundamentals  and  asymmetric  information  on  the 
differential of interest rates, but applied to the context of Asian crisis. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Data can precisely be obtained from this page: http://www.cefconnect.com/Pricing/DailyPricing.aspx 
5  The  Markov-Switching  program  is  available  on  the  webpage  of  Atsushi  Matsumoto 
http://www.geocities.jp/atsmatsumoto/index.html.  Some  modifications  were  done  in  order  to  fit  our  model’s 
specification. 
6 LR=-2(Lc-Lnc) where Lc and Lnc are Max L. for constraint and non constraint models, respectively. 
7 If 
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4  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have investigated the role of information disparities in the case of Asian 
crisis. We particularly focused on two South East Asian countries, namely, Indonesia and 
Malaysia. Our framework is based on Tillmann’s model with a slight difference. Country 
funds premia are used to approximate the dispersion of information among investors. We find 
that  disparate  information  raises  the  probability  of  a  currency  crisis,  with  a  significant 
asymmetric  impact  on  the  probability  of  transition,  hardly  depicted  only  for  the  case  of 
Indonesia. This paper relates to the role that transparency plays in currency crisis models. It 
will be more interesting to investigate the impact of disparate information on the probability 
of speculative attack in other East Asian countries (i.e. Thailand, Singapore, Korea, Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, Philippines). On step in this direction might be modelling DIR as a Markov 
Switching process for panel data. This will depend upon availability of data on country funds 
premia. There may be also scope for an empirical verification of multiple factors crisis (See 
Cerra and Saxena, 2002). Future research may be, then, seeing which of the following factors, 
namely,  fundamentals,  contagion  or  asymmetric  information  that  the  most  determines  the 
Asian currency crisis. 
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Note: Daily country fund premia plotted under the period 2/1/1997-31/12/1997 
 









































































































































































































Asian crisis : mid 
July 1997 
Asian crisis : mid 
July 1997 
The rupiah’s floating: mid 
August 1997   9 




Table 1- Fundamentals per country and expected signs 
 
  Notation  Indonesia  Malaysia  Expected 
sign 
Current account as a percentage of 
GDP 
cagdp  yes    - 
Domestic Credit Growth  dcrg    yes  + 
Real gross domestic product growth  rgdpg  yes  yes  - 
Temporary component of real 
exchange rate 
treer  yes  yes  ? 




Table 2- Closed-end country fund premia: Descriptive statistics 
 
Behaviour of country fund premia    
 






























IF  250  2.88  -17.02  54.98  17.15  -10.12  2.44  17.51  14.80  27.63*** 
(4.44) 
MF  251  4.49  -18.42  54.6  18.51  -9.98  2.26  20.22  15.03  30.6*** 
(4.54) 
Note: This table provides descriptive statistics of the daily premia for the period January 1997-December 1997, 
and compares the distribution of country fund premia before and during the crisis. The t-statistics in the last 
column are from regressions of premia on a constant and a dummy  variable  which is one for the 117-day 
subsequent to the Asian crisis, and 0 for the 117-day before the crisis. The t-statistics are corrected for serial 
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00 p  
         
0,981357*** 
  11 p           0,9350268*** 






























Sample  1990 : 3 - 2001 : 3 
 Max L  -410,7232  -362,7761  -403,14054  -374,1851  -363,55635 




Table 3.2- Wald test Results: Indonesia 
 
  ( ) ( ) 1
2
0 c H  
1
t w  
2
t w  
3
t w   PTF 
  ( ) ( ) 1 0 = = = t t s m s m   95,89425***   15,16532***   73,07619***   94,3337*** 
  1 1 q p =
8  23,95169***  -2,617626 e
-06  1,491540    






                                                 
8 H0 : the impact is symmetric   11 
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00 p  
         
0,9827272*** 
  11 p           0,967428*** 






























Sample  1987 : 5 – 2001 : 6 
 Max L  -407,62044  -326,61923  -323,54842  -326,42895  -330,48011 
Note: Asterisks refer to significance level: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
 
 
Table 4.2- Wald test results: Malaysia 
 
  ( ) ( ) 1
2
0 c H  
1
t w  
2
t w  
3
t w   PTF 
  ( ) ( ) 1 0 = = = t t s m s m   162,0024***  168,1440***  162,3830***   154,2807*** 
  1 1 q p =   0,2584267  0,2059565  1,022133    
Note: Asterisks refer to significance level: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  